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EDWARD A. CHRISTENSENf
THE PUBLIC HOUSING LEASING PROGRAM:
A WORKABLE RENT SUBSIDY?
After all, money, as they say, is miraculous.
Thomas Carlyle
The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965' embodied three
types of governmental programs to improve the housing of low and
middle income families-government owned and constructed housing,
loans at below-market interest rates to building owners,2 and subsidies
to tenants.3 Although the federal government had long provided
low-rent public housing4 and aided the construction of new housing
f Second year student, University of Chicago Law School, A.B., Stanford Uni-
versity.
1. 79 Stat. 451 (1965).
2. 12 U.S.C. § 1715 1 (d)(3) (1964), as amended 12 U.S.C. § 1715 l (d)
(Supp. II, 1966). Indeed, it was largely because the administration wanted to phase
out the 221 (d) (3) below-market interest rate program that it proposed the rent
subsidy program itself. A program of subsidized interest rates had proved un-
desirable principally for budgetary reasons because the full amount of the sub-
market interest rate loans appeared as a direct expenditure in the administrative
budget. Moreover, the fluctuating interest rate on loans made under the below-
market 221 (d) (3) program had led even its supporters to become dissatisfied
with its operation. See, e.g., Hearings, on H.R. 5840 Before the Subcommittee
on Housing of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2nd.
Sess., Ser. 2, pt. 1, at 1199 (1965) (statement of Ira S. Robbins, National Ass'n
of Housing and Redevelopment Officials) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Hearings].
3. Subsidizing tenants was hardly a new technique for improving the housing
of low income families. Subsidies have long been given by local welfare authorities
to enable recipients to obtain housing.
4. Since its inception in 1937, the low-rent public housing program has pro-
vided housing for more than 750,000 families. 1965 Hearings, supra note 2, at
201 (statement of Robert C. Weaver). By February 28, 1965, there were 581,092
units of public housing. 1965 Hearings, supra note 2, at 217. For a discussion
of the history of public housing see G. BEYER, HOUSING AND SOciETY 462-67
(1965).
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through its mortgage insurance programs,5 the 1965 Act marked the
federal government's first attempt to provide decent housing for low-
income families by increasing through subsidies the amount which
they could afford to pay for housing available in the private market.
Subsidizing low-income families recognizes the basic housing prob-
lem facing the American city: low-income families cannot afford to
pay enough rent to obtain housing which is decent, safe, and sanitary.
Among those families with an annual income of less than $2,000 in
1960, over 46.4 per cent lived in substandard units. The tenant's ina-
bility to pay a higher rent frequently prevents the landlord from prop-
erly maintaining the building, since rehabilitation or even ordinary
maintenance is not economical. 7 And the low return on investment in
low-rent housing limits the amount of new low-rent housing that is
being constructed8
5. Although the FHA mortgage program had over 38 billion dollars of insur-
ance outstanding, as of November 30, 1964, it had done little to aid urban housing
until the adoption of the 221 (d) (3) mortgage insurance program in 1964, which
provides housing for middle-income groups. 1965 Hearings, supra note 2, at 131.
6. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF HOUSING: 1960, pt. 1, table
A-4. This observation is further confirmed by noting that where the rental pay-
ment was less than $30 per month 78.8 per cent of the units were substandard
while at the more usual rent of $80-99 per month only 4.9 per cent of the units
were found to be substandard. Id. at table A-2.
7. A frequent proposal to ameliorate the condition of the slum tenant is to
impose additional duties on the landlord either through statutory change or
through collective bargaining contracts negotiated by the tenants themselves. While
in the short run these efforts might indeed improve the condition of the building
by channelling a larger share of profits into improvements and maintenance, they
hardly provide a complete solution to the need for decent low-rent housing. Unless
an organization such as a tenant union can reduce the cost of maintenance
through a program of tenant education, rents must necessarily increase as more
money is allocated for maintenance and improvements. If such tenant economies
were not achieved and rents were not increased, an actual decline in the supply
of low-rent housing would be likely for in many cases it would no longer be profit-
able to invest in an enterprise with such a low return on capital for the relatively
high risk of investment.
Imposing additional duties upon the owners of low-rent housing can be suc-
cessful only if coupled with a mechanism for increasing the amount which these
tenants can afford to pay as rent. Clearly, a good case can be made for imposing
certain duties on landlords because they are in the best position to perform the
service or prevent the harm. See Calabresi, The Wonderful World of Blum and
Kalven, 75 YALE L.J. 216 (1965). But in imposing legal duties we must ask if the
gain fr6m imposing a legal duty is greater than the costs which it necessarily pro-
duces. For an economic analysis of this type of problem, which emphasizes the
ways in which the parties can obtain a satisfactory solution through bargaining,
see Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960).
8. Although some slumlords obtain a high return on their investment in slum
property, this could hardly be the general case considering the shortage of low-
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The Act provided two new programs for utilizing private low-rent
housing by increasing the purchasing power of low-income tenants9-
the leasing of private housing by public housing agencies 0 and the
rent supplement." While the leasing provision, a Republican pro-
rent housing. Moreover, the actual profits of these slumlords are difficult to calcu-
late because they frequently obtain such a high return by consuming their capital-
the building itself-by their failure to maintain. It is likely that the average
owner of low-rent housing gets a return on his investment of about eight per cent.
Considering the risk of such an investment in light of strict code enforcement,
receiverships, and increasingly generous defenses to forcible detainer actions, it
cannot be surprising that there is a shortage of decent low-rent housing in most
communities while there is often a surplus of luxury apartments which yield a
higher return. Indeed, some of the more pessimistic observers have speculated that
private investment can no longer provide housing for the low-income segment of
the population. For a theoretical discussion of the economic problem see R. TuR-
vEY, THE ECONoMICS OF REAL PROPERTY (1957).
9. The Act in its final form gave little assistance to the so-called middle income
families who were above the public housing ceilings but still unable to afford
decent housing in the private market. Because of a desire to protect the owners
of private housing from competition by the government, the Housing Act of 1937
had set the income limit for public housing below the level of income necessary
to obtain decent housing in the private market. The Act, as amended in. 1949,
required that income limits on admission for public housing be 20 per cent below
the income needed to meet the cost of standard private housing in the community.
Thus, many families who were slightly above the income limits for public housing
were forced by the act to remain in slum housing. While the rent supplement
program as originally proposed by the administration was intended to aid these
"middle income" families, by the time the bill emerged from Congress, the supple-
ment was limited to those eligible for public housing who were also displaced by
governmental action, sixty-two years of age or older, physically handicapped,
occupying substandard housing or a victim of a natural disaster. 12 U.S.C.
1701s (c) (Supp. II, 1966).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1421b (Supp. II, 1966). The terminology in the area is con-
fusing. Most commonly the leasing program is referred to as the rent subsidy pro-
gram which leads to much confusion since the Federal program of rent supple-
ments is also popularly known as the rent subsidy program. E.g., Chicago Daily
News, October 15, 1966, at 20, col. 7.
Even before the 1965 Act, local authorities could lease private units in the
community. Yet only with the adoption of a flexible annual contribution formula
in the 1965 Act did such a program become practicable. See note 27, infra.
11. 12 U.S.C. § 1701s (Supp. II, 1966). It was on this second program, the
payment of rent supplements, that the administration had originally pinned its
hopes of an all-out assault on the shortage of lower and moderate income housing.
Introducing the act to Congress, President Johnson described the rent subsidy as
"the most crucial new instrument in our effort to improve the American city."
111 CoNo. REc. 3910 (1965). With the federal government channeling large
amounts of money into the lower and moderate income housing market through
the payment of rent supplements, the program promised to result in the construc-
tion of 500,000 new units in four years. 111 CoNG. Rrct. 14872 (1965) (remarks
of Rep. Barrett).
The rent supplement program pays the building owner the amount by which
the rent for the unit exceeds one-fourth of the tenant's income. 12 U.S.C. § 1701
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posal of the year before, encountered little resistance, the strikingly
similar rent supplement program met with vehement Congressional
opposition. Sounding the tocsin, Arthur Krock proclaimed, "The real
issue is whether the Federal Union is to undergo its greatest transfor-
mation thus far into a collective state."'12 With the opposition mobi-
lized, the rent supplement program was greatly restricted as it passed
through Congress and has had little impact because of continued con-
gressional unwillingness to appropriate funds.2 The leasing program,
on the other hand, promises to work some significant changes in the
landlord-tenant relationship and indeed, in the low-rent housing mar-
ket itself. Because the leasing program offers a novel approach, likely
to find continuing Congressional support, this article will examine it
as a potential solution to our need for decent low-rent housing.
(d) (Supp. II, 1966). For a complete discussion of this program see, Krier, The
Rent Supplement Program of 1965: Out of the Ghetto into the .. .? 19 STAN.
L. REV. 555 (1967). As with the leasing program, the government would enter
into a contract with the building owner guaranteeing the payment of the subsidy.
Unlike the leasing program, however, there would be little government control,
and the features of the traditional landlord-tenant relationship would be retained.
The tenant would not be a sublessee of the government but a lessee of the
building owner. The government's only relation to the landlord would be the pay-
ment of the subsidy over the 40-year period of the contract. The rent supplement
tenant would pay his rent directly to the landlord, and the government would
retain no responsibility for the actions of the tenant. For a detailed description of
the operation of the contract see 1965 Hearings, supra note 2, 248 (statement of
Robert C. Weaver).
12. New York Times, May 27, 1965, at 36, col. 3. But see reply of Rep. Bar-
rett, id, June 14, 1965, at 32, col. 4. The violent resistance which the rent subsidy
program encountered surprised some of its supporters. The startled New York
Times declared, "For no valid reason the rent supplement program has become
the focus of controversy." New York Times, June 14, 1965, at 32, col. 1. After
all, the rent supplement program was very similar in effect to the leasing program
contained in the same bill. Both were government subsidies to enable lower income
families to afford more expensive housing. Yet the conservatives' criticism should
have been anticipated. In the opinion of the program's critics the program was
obnoxious because it allowed a neighbor to pay a lower rent for the same ac-
commodations. Moreover, the payments seemed remarkably similar to a gift be-
cause the government retained so little control. Such criticism has continued and
even greater opposition is likely in the 90th Congress.
13. The maximum yearly appropriation authorized was reduced from $50 mil-
lion in the administration's bill to $30 million in the final act. 12 U.S.C. 1701s
(a) (Supp. II, 1966). The actual contract authorization for fiscal 1966 was, how-
ever, only $12 million. In addition, the appropriation bill imposed a workable
program requirement which made projects subject to local approval. Pub. L. 89-
426, (May 13, 1966). Such a local control rider attached to the appropriation
poses another major threat to the supplement plan since local authorities could
use the workable program requirement to block supplement projects which might
promote both racial and economic integration.
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I. THE LEASING PROGRAM-ITS OPERATIONS AND ADVANTAGES
Although more complex than the better known rent supplement
program, the public housing leasing program is still very simple in its
operation. Under the leasing program, public housing authorities are
permitted to lease suitable apartments from private owners who are
willing to make some of their units available for public housing.1"
The authority, in turn, subleases these units to tenants eligible for
public housing.1 5 The owner receives the full rent from the public
housing agency while the agency collects a lower rent based on the
tenant's income.' 6
With the acute shortage of public housing and the growing dissatis-
faction with the vertical ghettos produced by the existing public hous-
ing program, 7 the leasing of private housing is an attractive new ap-
proach. By early 1965 the number waiting for public housing through-
out the nation stood at over 500,000.18 Moreover, limiting the maxi-
mum average unit cost of public housing to $20,000, irrespective of
family size or the number of bedrooms, frequently prevented public
housing from meeting the needs of large families. 9 In addition,
existing projects often intensified existing educational, recreational,
and law enforcement problems because of the increased population
density they produced.
By avoiding the political stalemates and administrative difficulties
associated with the construction of large public housing projects, the
leasing of private housing could increase the supply of public hous-
ing. In many communities the fear of a sharp increase in the num-
14. The relationship between the landlord and the authority is governed not
only by a lease but also by contract in the form of a participation agreement.
15. In Chicago the sublease agreement is almost identical to the normal Chicago
Housing Authority tenant lease. The tenant agrees to pay the Chicago Housing
Authority for necessary repairs to the premises. The lease declares that the
agency's power of revocation is "unqualified and unrestricted, nor need any reason
be given therefor."
16. The Chicago Housing Authority charges the tenant $1.00 per month rent
for each $55 of annual income after certain authorized deductions including social
security payment, retirement payments, compulsory insurance payments, union
dues, special work clothes, excess transportation, excess medical payments, support
contributions and child care.
17. E.g. 111 CONo. Rac. 16938 (1965). See generally BAUER, THE DREARY
DEADLOCK o1 PUBLIC HousiNo, ARCHrrECTURAL FORUM, May 1957, p. 140;
Abrams, Public Housing Myths, THE Naw LEADER, July 25, 1955, pp. 3-6.
18. 111 CONO. Rc. 14881-82 (1965). This is a somewhat deceptive estimate
of actual needs since many communities have failed to establish public housing
authorities. The number in New York City alone stood at over 100,000.
19. See 1965 Hearings, supra note 2, at 312.
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ber of low-income families living in an area has prevented the
construction of additional public housing or, indeed, even the estab-
lishment of a public housing authority. Because housing of low-
income families under the leasing program would not result in any
concentration of public housing tenants, some communities previously
unwilling to establish a public housing program may establish au-
thorities and confine their participation to the leasing program.2 0
Moreover, once an authority was established, the amount of housing
available would depend not on local approval of potential sites but
the availability of dwellings in the private housing market.
This program could also promote the most efficient utilization of
the existing private housing supply by making low-income families
aware of available housing in the community. As the initial step
for participation in the leasing program, the housing authority ob-
tains a list of all available private housing which would be suitable
for low-rent housing.21 The agency then contacts the building owners
and urges them to participate in the program. By discovering the
units suitable for low-rent housing in the community and making
its findings available to community organizations serving low-income
families, the agency could eliminate the geographical factors which
often confine the low-income family's search for housing to its own
neighborhood.
The program's greatest contribution to the efficient utilization of
the supply of decent housing in the community is, however, the avail-
ability of the subsidy contained in the public housing rent formula.
Many low-income families continue to live in slum conditions despite
the availability of decent housing in their own communities because
they are unable to pay the higher rents demanded by these vacant
properties.2 2 With the public housing contribution, this vacant hous-
ing would be fully utilized. Because they pay only a portion of the
unit's full rent, public housing tenants would be able to occupy more
expensive accomodations while paying the same rent previously paid
for substandard housing.
20. San Jose, California, a city which did not previously have a public housing
program, has established an authority and is participating exclusively in the leasing
program. In the first month of operation over 670 applications were made to the
authority and 44 families placed in housing units leased by the local housing
authority from private landlords. The majority of the families were placed in
three and four bedroom units. San Jose Mercury, Nov. 10, 1966, at 7, col. 1.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1421b (b) (Supp. II, 1966).
22. 1965 Hearings, supra note 2, at 75 (statement of Robert Weaver).
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Unlike the existing public housing program, which forces tenants
to move once their earning power increases above the maximum per-
mitted by the authority, the leasing program can produce stable,
economically-integrated housing for low-income families. The leasing
program will integrate low-income tenants with those of higher eco-
nomic levels rather than confining them to the high-rise ghettos of
existing public housing. Because the law permits the public housing
agency to lease only 10 per cent of the units in any building to ac-
commodate public housing tenants, some economic integration is as-
sured.23 Although the amount of integration is limited somewhat
by requiring that rentals charged by the public housing agency be
within the financial range of low-income families, the program is
still a substantial improvement over confining the poor to existing
public housing projects. The association with wealthier tenants pro-
duced by the leasing program should expose the public housing tenant
to a different way of living, and eliminate the stigma of poverty so
often associated with present public housing projects. In addition,
the leasing program can create a more stable environment than exist-
ing public housing because the tenant will not be forced to move
when his income exceeds the public housing ceiling.2' The low-
income family placed by the public housing agency in a private unit
is encouraged to enter into a leasing agreement with the building
owner at the market rent once his income has exceeded the public
housing ceiling.25
The landlord, too, will benefit from participation in the program
since the rents paid by the public housing agency will often enable
him to improve or maintain his building. Those landlords in dete-
riorating neighborhoods who cannot afford to maintain their build-
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1421b (c) (Supp. II, 1966). The 10 per cent limitation pro-
posed by the act can, however, be waived whenever the agency determines it should
not apply because of the building in which the units are leased. In Chicago, for
example, the participation agreement between the authority and the landlord pro-
vides for the leasing of 33 per cent of the units in a building. Because of the small
number of units in some buildings participating in the program this seems to be
a reasonable figure. Even with the figure at 33 per cent there is no possibility
that the leasing project would produce a concentration of public housing families.
24. Both the landlord participation agreement and the lease between the Chi-
cago Housing Authority and the landlord provide options for tenant occupancy
after the tenant no longer requires public assistance. Indeed the Chicago authority
expects that in many cases the landlord will charge the tenant a lower rent in
order to keep him in the building.
25. The Federal Housing Assistance Administration is also encouraging local
authorities to include a provision in the lease allowing the tenant to purchase the
unit.
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ings because tenants are unable to afford rents which would make
maintenance economically feasible will be assisted in their efforts to
keep the buildings in repair by the higher rents paid by the public
housing agency. In addition, many landlords whose buildings are
in a substandard condition will be able to improve their units, since
the agency is authorized to lease apartments which can be rehabil-
itated.26 By entering into five-year leases27 with the public housing
agency these landlords will be able to obtain loans to be used in
renovating their buildings. Consequently, the program would add
to the supply of decent low-rent housing in the community.
Eventually, a broad leasing program could produce an increase
of low-rent housing through new construction. By increasing the
amount which low-income families can afford to pay for housing, the
leasing program would create a greater demand for housing which
can be obtained at the subsidized rent levels. Initially, this increased
demand will inflate the cost of such housing by moving more people
into the low and middle income housing market which, at first, will
be unable to expand sufficiently to satisfy the increased demand. As-
suming, however, that the combination of higher rents and the re-
duction of risk to the landlord because of the guarantees made by
the agency would make investment in such moderate rent housing
profitable, the overall effect of the program will be to increase the
supply of low-income housing.
II. POLTICAL AND SOCIAL LIMITATIONS ON THE PROGRAM
Yet even in its present restricted form, the leasing program has
not been a complete success, partly because the act limits the rents
which the public housing agency may pay for private housing. The
housing authority's subsidy for accomodations in private housing
must not exceed the fixed annual contribution which the federal
government would have granted the agency for the construction of
new housing designed to accomodate the comparable number, sizes,
and kinds of families.2s The federal government's annual contribu-
tion for new public housing is the amount necessary to amortize and
pay the interest on loans obtained to finance the project, while operat-
26. Interview with Edmund H. Sadowski, Assistant General Counsel, Chicago
Housing Authority, September 26, 1966.
27. 80 Stat. 1284 (1966).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1421b (e) (Supp. I1,-1966).
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ing expenses are borne by rents charged the tenants. 29 Even though
this limitation does not make the program unworkable, it clearly
does require economy. In Chicago, for example, the housing agency
is authorized to pay up to $97.50 per month for renting a private
apartment of one bedroom; up to $118.50 per month for two bed-
room units; up to $141.00 for four bedrooms; and up to $179.00 per
month for apartments with five bedrooms.30
An additional limitation, not contained in the Act itself, has even
more severely limited the program's effectiveness. The Federal Hous-
ing Assistance Administration has restricted the ability of the public
housing agency to enter the private housing market where there is a
low vacancy rate in standard housing in the community. No leasing
program is permitted to reduce the city-wide vacancy rate to lower
than three per cent for any size unit.31 In Chicago, this limitation has
confined the program to studio and one bedroom units because in
other size units the vacancy rate is lower than the established three
per cent.32 Such a limitation has been imposed because of the federal
government's fear of inflation. Yet, if the supply of low-rent housing
is to be increased, as the federal government certainly desires,* there
will be some inflation initially. As the effective demand for such
housing increases because of the public housing subsidy, prices will
29. For a fuller explanation of the flexible formula for annual contributions
adopted by the 1965 Act see 1965 Hearings, supra note 2, at 204. Since the local
housing authority could obtain annual contributions measured by the fixed annual
contribution which the federal government would have granted for new housing
designed to accommodate a comparable number of families, programs for utiliza-
tion of private housing either through lease or purchase became possible. Indeed,
even programs for tenant lease-purchase can now be established by the authority.
A proposal for such a program has been made by Ira S. Robbins, 1965 Hearings,
supra note 2, at 1203-04. See also Address by Marie C. McGuire, National Coun-
dl on Aging Conference, March 3, 1965 reprinted in part in 1965 Hearings,
supra note 2, at 1204.
30. CHIcAGo HOUSING AUTHORITY PAMPHLET, 1966 LEASING PROGRAM (1966)
[hereinafter cited as 1966 LEASING PROGRAM]. An average tenant would pay only
$65 for a one-bedroom apartment and $98.50 for a five-bedroom unit.
31. The vacancy rate is for standard dwellings and does not preclude the leas-
ing of new units or units which can be rehabilitated.
32. Letter from Edmund H. Sadowski, Assistant General Counsel, Chicago
Housing Authority, to author, September 29, 1966. The full rigor of this limita-
tion has been avoided by a provisional authorization allowing the leasing of units
within the restricted sizes. Chicago's low vacancy rate does not seem atypical. For
the first quarter of 1966 the vacancy rate for standard rental housing in metro-
politan areas was only 2.8 per cent. While in the United States the rental vacancy
rate was 7.5 per cent, in the Northeast the rate was only 4.9 per cent. U.S. BuaRu
OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT HOUSING REPORTS, Series H-Ill (1966).
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necessarily rise, but only until the demand can be met by the con-
struction of additional low-rent housing.
Community segregation practices, too, have restricted the ability
of public housing agencies to obtain decent apartments. Because the
agency possesses no power of condemnation to compel landlords to
participate in the program, the housing must voluntarily be made
available for public housing use. With the low vacancy rate in the
ghetto, particularly in housing that would qualify as decent, safe, and
sanitary, obtaining vacant units is difficult. Outside the ghetto the
forces of segregation could limit the program substantially. Landlords
already reluctant to rent to Negro tenants would hardly be induced
by the limited subsidy offered by the public housing agency to accept
low-income Negro tenants. Only if there were a tacit agreement ex-
cluding or severely limiting the number of Negro tenants would it be
likely that the landlords in all-white neighborhoods would partici-
pate.33 Consequently, the program's effectiveness would seem to be
confined to those neighborhoods where the white exodus has already
created a vacuum in the housing market.34
The unwillingness of landlords in all-white neighborhoods to par-
ticipate in the leasing program could, of course, be overcome by
granting the agency the power to condemn a leasehold interest.3 5
Such a power is easily sustained under the rationale of previous con-
demnation cases allowing condemnation for a use restricted to private
persons as long as there is a definite benefit to the community.3, Yet,
33. Clearly these are two undesirable alternatives. The Chicago Housing
Authority has made it clear that "NO discrimination may be exercised in the
selection or approval of tenants or in the provision of services, or in any other
manner, against any person because of race, creed, color, or national origin."
1966 LEASING PROGRAM (emphasis in original).
34. The 190 apartments occupied thus far are "scattered throughout the city"
according to Harry J. Schneider, Managing Director, Chicago Housing Authority.
In some instances, he said, Negro tenants were moved to previously all-white build-
ings in "certain changing neighborhoods." Chicago Tribune, October 3, 1966, at
5, col. 1. While community segregation practices restrict the leasing program, they
can be overcome by basic economic forces. A landlord with a high vacancy rate
in an all-white area might come to participate in the program because it is the
only way in which he could realize a profit on his investment. Site location for
government-owned public housing projects has been stalled by the same com-
munity balkanization. Because site selection requires community approval, it seems
less likely to succeed in the face of prejudice than the leasing program which de.
pends pr;marily on the forces of the private housing market.
35. While clearly such a power was not contemplated by Congress in approv-
ing the leasing program, the combination of the flexible formula for annual con-
tributions and state eminent domain statutes render it a possible solution. See
e.g., Ill. Rev. Stats. ch. 67Y2, § 8.15 (1965).
36. See People ex rel. Gutknecht v. Chicago, 414 Ill. 600, 111 N.E.2d 626
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this power would be a mixed blessing. In all likelihood it would
bring with it substantial community control over site selection3- and
would subject the agency to the same political and social resistance
which has paralyzed existing public housing in many communities.3 8
Inroads upon discriminatory practices of landlords could, however,
be made with the aid of strong open occupancy legislation. In those
cases where discrimination can be established, the public housing
authority, with its legal resources, should be able to compel obedience
to the statute.39
Aside from a guarantee that the number of public housing tenants
would be limited,0 the best hope for overcoming existing segregation
patterns in the community is the economic power which the leasing
program gives the public housing agency. Where vacancy rates in the
white community are high, landlords will be forced to weigh carefully
the competing costs of receiving the full rent for the unit by accept-
ing Negro tenants or suffering a loss of rent by following community
social behavior. In almost any protracted struggle between vacancy
and participation, the landlord will opt for participation. A modifica-
tion of existing segregation patterns is far more likely to result' from
economic demands than from any change in the community's political
and social behavior.
While the amounts paid by the public housing authority hardly
seem inducements to landlord participation, except where the land-
lord could not obtain an equal sum either because of the tenant's
inability to pay or because of a high vacancy rate, the monetary value
of the rental payments does not reflect the true yalue of participation
to the landlord. Both the guarantee of rentals, and the assurance
of recovery by the owner against the public housing agency for dam-
age done to the building by a tenant, provide economic incentives for
owner participation. Since the housing authority is the lessee and the
(1953) noted in 101 U. PA. L. REv. at 1246 (1953). Contra, Adams v. Housing
Authority of Daytona, 60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952).
37. Such a control could take the form of the workable program requirement
42 U.S.C. §§ 1410 (e), 1451 (c) (1964) imposed upon the choice of location
of both existing public housing and 221 (d) (3) housing participating in the rent
supplement program. See note 13, supra. Or the approval of a redevelopment
plan by local authorities. For an example of a condemnation statute, which does
this see Ill. Rev. Stats. ch. 67Y2, §§ 8.14, 8.15 (1965).
38. See note 20 and accompanying text, supra.
39. The only problem would seem to be one of standing. It is likely that the
agency could not bring the action on behalf of itself since it is not being discrimi-
nated against. It could, however, provide representation for an aggrieved tenant.
40. See note 23 and accompanying text, supra.
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public housing tenant its sublessee, the housing authority remains
liable for damage done by the tenant. This should eliminate the land-
lord's common complaint that he cannot recover against the low-
income tenant for damage done to the building. It should also reduce
much of the risk associated with investment in low-income housing.
Moreover, because of its liability for damage, the housing authority
is pressured to embark on a program of tenant education which could
produce a reduction in the landlord's cost of ordinary maintenance.
Because of the agency's role as sublessor, the public housing leasing
program will be more costly than a direct subsidy program. Although
the program's initial administrative costs would be low because the
organization and information necessary for such a program is, for the
post part, already to be found in existing public housing authorities,
the potential liability of the housing authority for damage done by its
sublessees would impose higher costs.4 1
III. CHANGES IN THE LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP
The leasing of private housing by a public housing agency presents
a substantial modification of the traditional landlord-tenant relation-
ship. The public housing authority executes a normal lease with the
building owner, and then subleases to a public housing tenant. The
landlord is responsible to the housing authority for the maintenance
of the building, while the authority is liable for the acts of its sub-
lessee.
Although the housing act provided that the selection of tenants re-
mained with the landlord, subject to the agency's annual contribu-
tion contract with the federal government, in practice the landlord's
power of selection is far from absolute. From the outset it was obvious
that if the vast numbers already waiting for public housing were to
be treated equitably, the agency would have to impose administrative
restrictions on the landlord's choice of tenants. In addition, if the
agency were to implement its policy of integration by assigning those
first on the waiting list to the first vacancy, it would also have to
restrict the landlord's choice.42
41. The increased costs of the leasing program would not be offset by the lower
costs of public housing debt financing since payments would be direct cash
subsidies. See 1965 Hearings, supra note 2, at 429 (statement of Ira S. Robbins
urging the use of the public housing financing formula as the most inexpensive
method of increasing the supply of low-rent housing).
42. See generally, Comment, Public Housing and Discrimination, 64 Msau. L.
R v. 871, 875 (1966).
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Chicago has solved this problem by offering the landlord three
programs of tenant selection-each of which restricts his traditional
freedom of choice.43 One program allows the owner to select the
tenant with the approval of the housing authority. A second permits
tenant selection by the Chicago Housing Authority with no right of
approval in the owner. It is the third program, however, that seems
most likely to provide a workable solution. It allows the landlord to
reject tenants referred by the housing authority, thereby utilizing the
existing waiting lists while giving the landlord a role in tenant selec-
tion. This third program also has a safeguard against discrimination
since it permits the landlord to reject only two referrals within a six-
month period. To say that the landlord retains the function of tenant
selection, subject to the provisions of the contract between the land-
lord and the agency, is clearly a false promise of autonomy. His role
in the selection of tenants must necessarily be substantially reduced.
At least theoretically, the greatest change in the normal landlord-
tenant relationship is the complete denial of the landlord's power to
remove tenants. Although the owner may ask the agency to remove
a tenant, the agency retains the sole right to give notice to vacate. 44
In practice, however, this limitation has not proved substantial. The
lease between the tenant and the public housing authority permits
eviction without cause and has frequently been upheld by the courts
as necessary for the efficient management of public housing.45
Even though no reason is given for the termination of the lease, the
housing authority does set down criteria for removal in its internal
regulations. The three major grounds for termination are excessive
income, non-payment of rent, and undesirability. It is unlikely that
the agency would not accede to the landlord's recommendation to
43. Chicago Housing Authority Participation Agreement (Sublease Plan).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1421b (d) (3) (Supp. II, 1966). In Chicago the authority's
control has been greatly weakened by allowing the landlord to terminate his par-
ticipation in the program upon 15 days notice in writing. Chicago Housing
Authority Participation Agreement.
45. See e.g., Thorpe v. Durham Housing Authority, 267 N.C. 431, 148 S.E.2d
290 (1966), rev'd per curiam, 87 Sup. Ct. 1244 (1967). The Court apparently
believed that this problem had been solved by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development in a circular of Feb. 7, 1967, which provided: "Since this is
a federally assisted program, we believe it is essential that no tenant be given
notice to vacate without being told by the Local Authority, in a private conference
or other appropriate manner, the reasons for the eviction and given an opportunity
to make such reply or explanation as he may wish." In his concurring opinion,
Justice Douglas argued that the circular had done little to protect the tenant
against arbitrary action by the housing authority and that the basic problem of
eviction without cause remained to be faced by the Court. 87 Sup. Ct. at 1248.
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evict an "undesirable" tenant. In Chicago, the initial determination
of a tenant's undesirability is made by the building owner who then
refers the action to the Central Rental Office for review. 4" When the
Central Rental Office determines that a tenant's lease should be termi-
nated, the recommendation is reviewed by a three-man board. This
board is composed of one member from the Rental Office, one mem-
ber of the legal office, and the deputy direct6r of the housing
authority.47 The review, however, is not a group review since each
member examines the file independently. After review the tenant is
served with a fifteen-day notice of termination, and if he fails to
vacate, a forcible detainer action may be brought by the private land-
lord.
This review procedure hardly seems an effective protection of the
tenant's rights. All review is by housing authority personnel. Only
if the tenant refuses to move is the case reviewed by the courts, and
even that procedure is unlikely to delay removal since a tenant can be
evicted without cause. With the liberal eviction provisions of the
public housing authority, the landlord could very well have more
power to evict a public housing tenant than his non-public housing
tenants.
The eviction provisions which characterize the conventional rela-
tionship between the tenant and the public housing authority have
such a potential for arbitrary action that they have been frequently
challenged both in and outside the courts.48 Indeed, in one city,
tenants have succeeded in requiring the public housing agency to
show cause before evicting.49 Although such a broad power of eviction
can perhaps be justified on grounds of necessity, unless the need for
quick eviction is very great it would seem unwise to continue to evict
without cause because action of this kind has a negative psychological
effect on the public housing tenant. With the use of standard private
leases, another stigma of being a public housing tenant would be re-
moved.
Under the statute, the maintenance of the unit remains within the
landlord's control. The Act, in a section notable for its vagueness,
provides that "maintenance and replacements shall be in accordance
46. Chicago Housing Authority Regulations. These are internal operating
procedures which apparently have no binding effect upon the authority.
47. id.
48. See case cited in footnote 45, supra.
49. Public housing tenants in Boston have succeeded in obtaining a lease which
allows the agency to evict only for cause.
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with the standard practice for the building concerned."50 The par-
ticipation agreement between the housing authority and the land-
lord, however, spells out the standard of maintenance in more detail.
It requires the landlord to submit a current certificate of building
inspection and allows the housing authority to inspect the building
periodically to see that it is being properly maintained. How often
this power will be exercised is in doubt. But the housing agency's
staff of inspectors and lawyers, coupled with its superior bargaining
position, makes it much more likely that the tenant will live in a
properly maintained building. The role of the housing agency as
intermediary between landlord and tenant and its ability to enforce
rights claimed by both represent a significant improvement over the
normal landlord-tenant relationship.
IV. AN APPRAISAL
The program for leasing of private housing by public housing
agencies embodied in the 1965 Housing and Urban Development Act
is a valuable new approach to providing housing for low-income
families. Because the acquisition of housing units depends on the
forces of the market, rather than on the approval of local political
authority, its chances for success at a time when political forces have
become deadlocked over public housing are great. Moreover, the pro-
gram is more consistent with accepted welfare theory and more likely
to result in an actual improvement in the living conditions of low-
income families than direct subsidy programs. The sublease arrange-
ment places the public housing agency in a position to demand the
effective enforcement of the tenant's right to maintenance while
assuring the landlord of his right to recover for damage done to the
building by the tenant. In addition, the leasing program offers a
flexible and politically acceptable mechanism for utilizing private in-
vestment to meet the nation's low-income housing needs.
50. 42 U.S.C. I 1421b (d) (4) (Supp. II, 1966).
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APPENDIX
While the traditional landlord-tenant relationship is used as the vehicle for
conducting the leased public housing program, the role of the public housing
authority as an intermediary, the availability of a public subsidy, and the limitation
of the program to tenants of a designated economic class all create problems of
administration which alter the conventional instruments which are used in leasing
transactions. Problems arise particularly with reference to the selection and evic-
tion of tenants, as the lessor's usual plenary authority must be shared with the
public housing agency. The following clauses, drafted by William Hardy, a senior
law student at Washington University School of Law, are included here to illustrate
possible approaches to a solution of selection and eviction problems.
1, TENANT SELECTION
The Owner agrees to elect and abide by one of the following options in the
selection of tenants for occupancy of the dwelling units covered by this lease, and
the [public housing] Authority will execute subleases of the dwelling units with the
tenants so selected:
OPTION "A'
The Authority shall select the Tenants subject to the approval of the
Owner. Rent will be due for the term of the lease between the Authority
and the Owner, and the Authority shall pay the rent to the Owner in
monthly installments during the lease term including those periods of va-
cancy caused by the Authority's failure to refer a Tenant to the Owner.
However, no rent is due from the Authority, and the Authority shall not
pay rent to the Owner, from the date the Owner refuses to accept a Ten-
ant until the date a Tenant is approved for the premises, and the rent
provided for in the lease is to be reduced by this amount. The Authority
shall refer Tenants to the Owner within a reasonable period of time not
to exceed one week after a vacancy occurs, or after the Owner refuses
to approve a referred Tenant. After the Authority has referred a Tenant
to the Owner, the Owner shall have five days within which to indicate
to the Authority in writing his approval or disapproval of the Tenant, and
after the expiration of this five-day period the Owner is deemed to have
approved the selection of that Tenant if the Authority has received no
notice from the Owner. If, during any six-month period, the Owner fails
or refuses to accept two referrals, the Authority shall have the right to
terminate this lease upon 15 days' notice in writing to the Owner.
OPTION "B"
The Authority shall select the Tenants with no right of approval in the
Owner. Rent is due for the term of the lease between the Authority and
the Owner, and the Authority shall pay the rent to the Owner in monthly
installments during the lease term, whether or not a dwelling unit covered
by this lease is occupied.
OPTION "C"
The Owner shall select the Tenants subject to the anti-discrimination
provision in paragraph - of this lease and subject to the approval of
the Authority in accordance with its eligibility requirements. Rent is due
for the term of the lease between the Authority and the Owner, and the
Authority shall pay the rent to the Owner in monthly installments during
the lease term. However, the Authority shall pay no rent to the Owner on
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any dwelling unit covered by this lease for any period of time during
which that dwelling unit is vacant or is occupied by an unapproved Ten-
ant
Immediately upon the execution of this lease, the Owner shall file a statement
in writing with the Authority, indicating which of these options he elects. During
the term of the lease, after fifteen days' notice in writing to the Authority, the
Owner may elect a different option and shall file a written statement indicating
his change in option with the Authority. During the term of this lease, the Owner
may change options no more than twice.
Comments
Strictly speaking, the housing authority is the "tenant" of the leased premises,
while individuals and families selected for residence in the dwelling units are sub-
tenants. However, the selection of the word "tenant" to describe the actual occu-
pants is closer to realities and is easier to comprehend. The draft clause incor-
porates options resembling those employed by the Chicago Housing Authority in
its participation agreement with the landlord. Option "A" gives the owner the
right to approve tenants selected by the Authority but qualifies this right by cut-
ting off rent from the date the owner disapproves a tenant and by providing for
termination if the owner refuses two tenants during any six-month period. This
option gives the owner a limited right of selection, but discourages arbitrary and
repeated exercise of his right to refuse tenants. Option "B" provides for selection
by the authority with no right of approval in the owner. Presumably, this .option
will appeal to those owners who are primarily concerned with guaranteed rental
payments for the lease term and who are willing to relinquish the right of tenant
selection in return for this assurance. Option "C" is designed to appeal to those
owners who wish to retain the right to select tenants, and who feel confident they
can find tenants who meet the authority's standards, thereby preventing the occur-
rence of vacancies and the consequent loss of rent.
2. TENANT EVICTION
The [public housing] Authority shall have the sole right to give notice to vacate
to any Tenant in a dwelling unit covered by this lease, and shall have the sole
right to initiate legal proceedings to evict any such Tenant. However, in any case
in which a Tenant violates any of the provisions of the sublease between the Ten-
ant and the Authority the Owner may recommend to the Authority in writing
that it initiate proceedings to evict the Tenant. [If within thirty days after receipt
of the Owner's recommendation the Authority has not initiated proceedings to
evict the Tenant, the Owner may request a hearing on the Authority's failure to
initiate eviction proceedings before the Tenant Review Board established by the
Authority.
Comments
The federal statute authorizing the ]eased public housing program provides
that the public housing authority has the sole right to give notice to vacate to
occupants of the leased premises, but that the owner has the right to make "repre-
sentations" to the authority asking for termination of a tenancy. This provision
is vague on several counts. It is not clear on who has the right to initiate the
legal eviction proceedings, although under the law of some states a lessor does not
have standing to evict a sublessee and only the housing authority could take legal
action in any case. While the owner may make "representations," it is not clear
whether any sanctions can be imposed on the authority for failure to take action
on his representations. Nor does it appear that any limitations are placed on the
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grounds which the owner may allege in making his representations. No additional
clarification is provided so far by administrative regulations.
This draft carries out the apparent intent of the federal statute, that sole power
to evict be lodged with the housing authority. Howevcr, the owner is in a much
better position to police his dwellings, and may become aware of tenant conduct
which ought to provide a basis for eviction. Experience with leased public hous-
ing experiments prior to the enactment of the federal statute, in which the right
of eviction was left with the owner, had indicated that owners were in some in-
3tances evicting tenants considered by them to be undesirable but who neverthe-
less were not guilty of any serious misconduct. For this reason, owner recommen-
dations for eviction are limited to those cases in which the tenant has actually
violated some provision of his sublease with the authority. This instrument will
have to be carefully drafted so that the tenant cannot be evicted for trivialities.
The bracketed clause is an option which gives the owner some recourse in case
the authority ignores his recommendation. Many public housing authorities have
tenant review boards which pass on recommendations for eviction. Presumably,
some of them have the power to make binding recommendations to the authority.
Another alternative would give the owner the option to terminate the lease when-
ever the authority refuses to evict tenants after a representation by the owner.
Whether a lease clause of this kind would be acceptable to the federal agency
is not clear.
Language to resolve the problem of divided responsibility for eviction is hard
to construct. Even the best screening policies will not eliminate in advance those
tenants who turn out to be destructive. Because the authority does not own the
premises, pressures to evict undesirable tenants from leased premises may not be
as strong as they are in projects which the authority owns. On the other hand,
possible tendencies on the part of owners to evict public assistance recipients, un-
wed mothers, and other disadvantaged occupants must also be controlled. Curi-
ously, occupants of dwelling units leased by a public housing authority may turn
out to have a stronger legal position than tenants in the authority's own projects.
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